Security fixes land exclusively on main; older release tags do not receive backports.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
main (post-v4.1.0) |
✅ Active (receives all security fixes) |
4.1.0 |
main (or the next release) for fixes published after v4.1.0 |
< 4.1.0 (4.0.x, 3.x, 2.x) |
❌ No |
Published security advisories, affected ranges, CVSS vectors, and fix commits are maintained canonically on GitHub:
Every published GitHub Security Advisory has an in-repository fix-trace row below, mechanically verified against GitHub's security-advisories?state=published API and main git ancestry by scripts/check_advisory_traces.py:
| Advisory | Published | Severity | Fix on main |
Summary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
GHSA-gc2v-v2jw-q499 |
2026-11-19 |
Medium | 3feffdf6 (#820, client-v0.4.0) |
cage-client <= 0.3.0 and GatewayClient: HTTP 403 refusals and 202/409/422 deferrals accepted without GovernanceEnvelope signature verification |
GHSA-c9j3-q7hh-p95m |
2026-11-19 |
Medium | dd27b66b (#815, AP-1 in docs/BREAKING_CHANGES.md) |
Governed financial advisor: CAGE_ALLOW_ASSERTED_PRINCIPAL accepted unverified end-user identities in enforcing postures (production/staging) despite documentation stating it was ignored there |
GHSA-5c7p-g73w-v4m3 |
2026-11-19 |
Medium | aa50d17d (#814) |
Governed inference proxy: non-content response fields bypassed output governance and PII redaction |
GHSA-797p-rrgm-4p56 |
2026-11-19 |
High | c145a9cc (#813) |
Governed financial advisor: require_api_key() accepted end-user OIDC tokens on service-only routes |
GHSA-cxxx-6xfq-vvp4 |
2026-11-18 |
Medium | f6313b20 (#809) |
provider_05 three-axiom attestation providers accepted live /v0.3/ responses as VERIFIED when v0.3 signature fields were stripped |
GHSA-5438-3wwf-qvcq |
2026-11-18 |
Medium | 1ad49289 (#808) |
actuator_03 quarantine adapter settled unsigned or unverifiable receipts as ACCEPTED without ACTUATOR_03_REQUIRE_SIGNED_RECEIPTS=true |
GHSA-348p-gfpg-qqm9 |
2026-11-18 |
Medium | 1aeed422 (#799) |
provider_06 evidence adapter sealed receipts not bound to the submitted evidence and returned unverified seals without a key manifest |
GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c |
2026-10-26 |
Medium | be23480b (v4.0.0) |
Finance causal tier risk boundary tripped 10,000x too high and zero-variance placebo refutation could not fail |
GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm |
2026-10-26 |
Medium | 863d4092 (v3.3.0) |
EU_ECB FRIA revocation not re-checked on POST_HITL; execute_trade_bounded and BTC case variants bypassed trade_governance.rego |
GHSA-w39v-5v7h-fxg9 |
2026-10-24 |
Medium | cec7ab29 (#529, v3.3.0) |
Model-controlled trader_role raised OPA fiscal limits on the committing trade path |
Earlier fixes resolved through public issues, internal audits, or pre-publication tracker entries are recorded in CHANGELOG.md and docs/POAM.md.
⚠️ Reference architecture notice: CAGE is a reference architecture and is not deployed to production. Advisories are published and fixed to ensure the codebase accurately represents the security posture claimed in associated research and compliance artifacts.
Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues.
To report a security vulnerability, please use the GitHub Security Advisory "Report a Vulnerability" feature. Please include:
- A description of the vulnerability and its potential impact
- Steps to reproduce the issue
- Any proof-of-concept code (if applicable)
- Your suggested fix (if you have one)
You should receive a response within 5 business days. If you do not receive a response, please follow up to ensure your report was received.
We follow a coordinated disclosure model:
- You report the vulnerability privately.
- We confirm receipt and begin investigation within 5 business days.
- We develop and test a fix.
- We release the fix and publish a security advisory.
- You may publicly disclose the vulnerability after the fix is released, or after 90 days from the initial report — whichever comes first.
- Use the private-fork
T=0advisory flow below whenever a fix alters a security, authentication, authorization, cryptographic, PII-redaction, or governance-tier boundary in a distributed artifact (cage-client,cage-conformance, container images) or inmainenforcement/policy code, and the PR diff itself exposes a real bypass or forgeability gap in prior commits or releases. - Use a direct public PR (no advisory) for hygiene cleanups, test-only or CI-gate additions, documentation/compliance updates, or structural refactors that close no bypass in any shipped artifact or
mainenforcement path. When uncertain whether an exposure warrants an advisory, default to theT=0flow.
GitHub Actions does not run on pull requests in temporary private forks, and
ruleset 25966171 (Require status checks on main, no bypass actor) requires nine
checks pinned to GitHub Actions — including Approved review or recorded bypass,
whose post-merge review-bypass-ledger.yml
check fails on main if a merge lacks a pre-merge review or Sigstore bypass
record. Do not disable ruleset 25966171 or add a bypass actor. Ruleset
26377312 (blocking non-fast-forward updates and deletion) also stays enabled
throughout.
Because pushing a fix branch to the public repository exposes the vulnerability
path before publication, publish first at T=0 and land via normal public
pull request(s):
- Develop and rehearse off-public: Stage fixes in the advisory's temporary
private fork or a local isolated worktree. Before
T=0, rebase onto currentorigin/main, run deterministic pre-commit checks and targeted security regression tests, and when landing multiple advisories together verify conflict-free multi-way merging acrossgit merge-tree --write-tree(including shared files such asdocs/BREAKING_CHANGES.md). - Pre-stage draft advisory metadata via the REST API: Before
T=0,PATCHeach draft onrepos/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/security-advisories/<GHSA_ID>with its final public description (including a concrete non-code mitigation and with any<!-- ... -->comment templates removed),ecosystem: "other"structured range (patched_versions: nullwhen remediating onmainahead of a tag), and verified CVSS 3.1 vector. Set reporter.creditsonce before acceptance, and omitcreditsfrom all subsequentPATCHpayloads oncecredits_detailed[].state == "accepted"(passingcreditsagain resets an accepted credit record back topending). Confirm HTTP200onGETread-back soT=0requires only a state transition. - Close all open PRs in the temporary private fork before publishing:
GitHub's advisory publish endpoint rejects
{"state": "published"}with HTTP422while any pull request in the temporary private fork remains open. Close open private-fork PRs before switching the advisory state. - At
T=0, publish first, then open public PR(s):PATCHeach draft with{"state": "published"}only (leaving.creditsand pre-staged metadata untouched).- Immediately push the pre-verified fix branch(es) to
originand open public pull request(s) againstmain, thenPATCHeach live advisory's remediation line to cite the open PR (Fix in flight in #<PR>alongside the immediate mitigation, omittingcredits). While a newly published advisory is<= 24hold and carriesFix in flight in #<PR>(beforeFixed on main in),scripts/check_advisory_traces.py(--verify-github) treats it as in-flight so#<PR>'s own CI stays green before its squash-merge commit SHA exists onmain.
- Run all checks, squash-merge, stamp, and verify read-back:
- Wait for all automated checks in ruleset 25966171 (strict up-to-date branch policy is disabled, so independent PRs can run checks in parallel). Never bypass a failing or pending check; rerun transient runner flakes, and if a PR stays stalled on CI past the disclosure window, update the in-flight advisory note to cite the staged PR commit SHA explicitly.
- Squash-merge once checks pass (
gh pr merge <PR> --squash --admin, where--adminin single-maintainer posture bypasses only ruleset 19769096's review rule while all nine checks in ruleset 25966171 pass). - Immediately stamp
Fixed on main in <SHA> (#<PR>)onto the published advisory (descriptiononly — never passcredits), perform aGETread-back on the advisory endpoint to verifystate == "published", the landedmainSHA, andcredits_detailed[].state == "accepted", and land the matching row in## Security Advisoriesabove soscripts/check_advisory_traces.py(--verify-github --strict) passes onmain. Delete temporary branches and worktrees after post-merge checks pass onmain.
When one or more draft advisories are held for a coordinated release date after
their fix commits have already landed on main:
- Pre-stage the
SECURITY.mdtrace branch locally beforeT=0: Add the new## Security Advisoriesrow(s) citing each already-mergedmainfix SHA and the scheduled publication date, and runuv run python scripts/check_advisory_traces.py --verboselocally to confirm every SHA is already an ancestor oforigin/main(do not open the PR before publishing, or--verify-githubwill reject unpublished GHSA IDs). - Publish and open the trace PR back-to-back at
T=0:PATCHeach draft advisory with{"state": "published"}only (never passingcredits), verifystate == "published"andcredits_detailed[].state == "accepted"viaGETread-back, and immediately push and open the pre-stagedSECURITY.mdPR. On that PR's CI run, the API's newly published set matchesSECURITY.md1-to-1 with zero missing rows, keepingadvisory-trace-paritygreen throughout the disclosure.
cage-client and cage-conformance are distributed exclusively via GitHub Releases (client-v* / conformance-v* tags with attached wheels/sdists) and GitHub Packages (GHCR) — not PyPI. PYPI_TRUSTED_PUBLISHING_ENABLED in .github/workflows/publish-client-sdk.yml is intentionally left unset/disabled due to Google branding and package-publishing policy and must not be enabled without explicit branding sign-off. Security advisories therefore use ecosystem: "other" with commit-SHA / GitHub Release remediation, and scripts/check_client_sdk_sync.py enforces [tool.cage.release] parity against GitHub release tags.
The following are in scope for security reports:
- Remote code execution in the governance gateway or compliance bridge
- Authentication/authorisation bypass in the governance pipeline
- Governance tier bypass (violations of the NoDirectBind invariant)
- Injection vulnerabilities (prompt injection, SQL injection, etc.)
- Cryptographic weaknesses in the Cloud KMS signing, kid-resolved trust anchors, development-only software signers (Ed25519 / HMAC-SHA256), routing seals, or the SHA-256 hash-chain implementation
- Control Barrier Function (CBF) race conditions or invariant violations
- Secrets or credentials exposed in the repository
The following are out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies (report these upstream)
- Denial-of-service attacks requiring physical access
- Social engineering attacks
- Issues in documentation only
CAGE is a domain-agnostic governance substrate designed for regulated
environments generally; finance (src/cage_finance/) is
the sole finalized, production-eligible domain plugin (healthcare in
src/cage_healthcare/ and physical_ai in
src/cage_physical_ai/ ship as non-production
reference stubs; POAM-2026-076–078, POAM-2026-198), and the jurisdictional
region (US_FED, EU_ECB or APAC_MAS, set by CAGE_DEPLOYMENT_REGION and
read only by resolve_deployment_region();
unknown values are refused, and an unset value is refused in enforcing postures
and resolves to US_FED only in dev, test and ci) determines which
regulatory controls are in scope for a given deployment. Key security controls are documented in:
docs/POAM.md— open findings and accepted risks;OSCAL_EVIDENCE_CLAIM_REGISTER.md— whether each control claim's evidence holds;compliance/gate_w_certification.json— what was last certified, at which commitdocs/security/SECURITY_STATUS.md— a superseded v3.0.1 snapshot (2026-08-28), kept because other documents link to it; do not cite it as current statusdocs/operations/KEY_ROTATION.md— cryptographic key lifecycle and rotation runbooks (SC-12 / IA-5)docs/architecture/GATEWAY_ARCHITECTURE.mdinfra/targets/gcp-gke/network_policy.tf— KubernetesNetworkPolicy& GKE Dataplane V2FQDNNetworkPolicyisolationCOMPLIANCE.md
| Control | Census Claim ID | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Governance signing | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#61c43f8a-6693-4049-ae09-edd8b22f500a |
Cloud KMS asymmetric signing (cloud providers in src/integrations/{gcp,aws,azure}/kms_provider.py, loaded via signer_factory.py); separate keys per role (gateway seal, reconciler snapshot, compliance-bridge evidence) with kid-resolved verification. Software Ed25519 / HMAC signers are refused under an enforcing posture and allowed only in dev/test/CI. 90-day rotation cadence per KEY_ROTATION.md |
| Routing seal (v3) | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#0c2d40d7-0d19-4b9d-9afa-6c80967b31b4 |
Single-use JWT signed by the gateway's governance signer (Cloud KMS in enforcing postures), verified by kid against an independently resolved trust anchor and bound to the SHA-256 evidence record_hash. The HMAC v2 4-tuple is a legacy path verify_seal() rejects while CAGE_SEAL_STRICT_MODE is true (the default) and always in production. Internal to /tools/execute and ConsequenceGateway — not used for caller authentication (partially-implemented: hermetic round-trip verified in test_routing_seal_asymmetric_roundtrip.py; strict-mode and live KMS round-trip read-back open under POAM-2026-235) |
| TLS & Transport Security | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#230de322-4b76-4a0d-b07d-267f4fa23769 |
Redis TLS 1.2+ enforcement (src/gateway/infrastructure/redis_client.py), OIDC JWKS verify=True enforcement, and Linkerd mTLS across meshed pods (tests/test_tls_enforcement.py). Outbound HTTP client wiring for create_hardened_client_context() (src/gateway/infrastructure/tls_context.py) is open under reopened POAM-2026-011 (docs/POAM.md) |
| Base Image Hardening | system-security-plan.yaml#s3000001-plat-si3-8000-platform0001 |
Advisor, gateway, compliance-bridge and NeMo Guardrails images use two-stage builds on a digest-pinned Wolfi base (cgr.dev/chainguard/wolfi-base) with no compiler, util-linux or package-manager cache in the runtime stage and a build-time apk upgrade; images are tagged by git SHA and their digests signed for Binary Authorization at build time (scripts/build_images.sh) (lula-validation-si2.yaml active; SI-3 runtime admission stub open) |
| Prompt injection detection | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#8e46d991-dd78-416a-897d-f909cb63be8d |
Aho-Corasick O(n) scan; 14+ patterns (partially-implemented: Stage 1 deterministic scan active; semantic tier opt-in) |
| PII protection | component-definition.yaml#e1f2a3b4-c5d6-7890-efab-901234567890 |
Presidio; 15 entity types; input + output (POAM-2026-146, POAM-2026-147 open) |
| Human-in-the-loop | component-definition.yaml#aarm2026-v7-context-overflow |
Redis-persisted checkpoint; TOCTOU remediation via post_hitl_rehydrate + post_hitl_revalidate (advisor calls the gateway's POST /governance/revalidate-post-hitl) (POAM-2026-196 open) |
| Control Barrier Function | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#943496c8-5b07-48e4-a175-731366d416fa |
Atomic Redis Lua (atomic_verify_and_commit()) with synchronous replica WAIT barrier, monotonic safety:fence_epoch with a shared high-water mark (safety:fence_epoch_hwm), and fail-closed state rollback |
| Evidence chain integrity | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#80d95b3a-12ae-4dd4-8db4-b52661335fa4 |
SHA-256 hash-chained NDJSON & Redis Streams db=1 (noeviction, Lua compare-and-append); enforced blocking durability in production (validate_evidence_stream_preconditions()); compliance-bridge EvidenceCustodian KMS batch attestation (EVIDENCE_KMS_KEY) to WORM storage and CustodyVerifier read-back verification (kid-resolved trust anchors, assert_citable() OSCAL citation gate) |
| mTLS | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#5f386745-cdda-431b-adec-850cdd899f3e |
Linkerd mTLS with a Google CAS trust anchor and defaultInboundPolicy = "all-authenticated" (infra/modules/service_mesh); per-workload Linkerd Server / HTTPRoute / AuthorizationPolicy across gateway, compliance-bridge, :9090 metrics, and :4191 admin ports (POAM-2026-007, POAM-2026-080, POAM-2026-195 closed 2026-11-13; component-definition census WEAKER pending restatement) |
| Caller identity | sp800-53-component-definition.yaml#ca8f96e2-69a3-4d6b-980c-962e73e075d8 |
Gateway ingress requires a Linkerd-verified l5d-client-id that matches CAGE_TRUSTED_CLIENT_IDENTITIES (WorkloadIdentityMiddleware); enforced in every environment, no header/body identity fallback, fail-closed 403. An RFC 9449 DPoPValidator (src/gateway/server/dpop_validator.py) ships and is unit-tested but is not yet wired into any ingress path. See docs/architecture/AGENT_IDENTITY_BINDING_SPEC.md (partially-implemented: SVID binding enforced; DPoP unwired) |
Egress credentials (v3.1.0, seam only — POAM-2026-072) |
system-security-plan.yaml#h8000009-5000-4000-8000-000000000017 |
CredentialBrokerAdapter Protocol in Layer 1 (src/gateway/governance/seams/credential_broker.py); when a concrete broker is supplied to Actuator01BindingAdapter, credentials are fetched per dispatch, masked in logs, excluded from ActuationReceipt, and fail closed on CredentialNotFound / CredentialAccessDenied via ingest_actuation_receipt(). At HEAD no concrete CredentialBrokerAdapter ships in src/ and BrokerActuator reads BROKER_API_KEY from os.environ (POAM-2026-072 reopened) |
| Egress lockdown | system-security-plan.yaml#p7000001-plat-sc7-8000-platform0001 |
GKE Dataplane V2 NetworkPolicy & FQDNNetworkPolicy resources in infra/targets/gcp-gke/network_policy.tf (POAM-2026-190, POAM-2026-195 closed; L3/L4 FQDN wildcard scope open under POAM-2026-152) |
| Token quota enforcement | component-definition.yaml#tqp007-req-0001-0000-0000-000000000001 |
Per-session step-count (≤12) and token (≤100k) via Redis atomic Lua counters; fail-closed (partially-implemented: Lua quota enforced; lula-validation-tqp007.yaml is rated Stub: it checks only that the gateway is ready with a REDIS_URL, not fail-closed behaviour, POAM-2026-219) |
Note: CAGE is a reference architecture. Regulated-environment deployers must conduct their own risk assessment before production use. For current status see
docs/POAM.mdand the security and compliance status section of the rootREADME.md.
Replay-attack closure: KMS-signed reconciliation payloads embed a
signed_atUnix timestamp. The verifier (KMSGovernanceSigner.verify()inkms_signer.py) rejects any payload wherenow - signed_at > 300 s(MAX_KMS_PAYLOAD_AGE_SECONDS).
Strict Replication & Fence Epoch Hardening: In production (
CAGE_ENV=prod),ControlBarrierFunctionasserts synchronous replica replication (CAGE_STRICT_REPLICATION=true). If replica synchronization fails duringWAIT, the local balance debit is automatically rolled back (rollback_state(cost)) and fails closed. Monotonicsafety:fence_epochcounters prevent stale-replica balance replays.
Audit Durability & Citation Guarantee:
validate_evidence_stream_preconditions()is posture-based: under an enforcing posture (anything but dev/test/ci; an unsetCAGE_ENVis production) it halts startup ifEVIDENCE_STREAM_ENABLED=false, or ifEVIDENCE_CHAIN_BLOCKING=falsewithout an explicitCAGE_ALLOW_NONBLOCKING_PROD=true. The gateway lifespan also starts the sink viastart_evidence_sink()and fails closed, so no routing seal orConsequenceGatewayEXECUTEverdict is issued without durable evidence commitment to the tamper-evident log. In the compliance bridge,EvidenceCustodiansigns batches withEVIDENCE_KMS_KEYand writes them viaput_if_absent()to WORM cold storage, whileCustodyVerifier(evidence_verifier.py) re-verifies the archive onEVIDENCE_VERIFY_INTERVAL_Sagainstkid-resolved trust anchors and gates OSCAL assessment citations (OSCAL_REQUIRE_VERIFIED_CUSTODY=true).
Header-spoofing closure: Caller identity is never read from application-layer data.
X-Agent-IDheaders, body-suppliedagent_idfields, and theX-CAGE-Routing-Sealheader are not accepted as authentication. The sole source of truth is thel5d-client-idheader, which the Linkerd inbound proxy sets from the verified mTLS peer certificate (or strips when there is none). The gateway accepts exactly one such header matchingCAGE_TRUSTED_CLIENT_IDENTITIES, in every environment; anything else fails closed with 403 rather than falling back to an anonymous principal. The meshAuthorizationPolicyindependently admits only the advisor's service account (POAM-2026-080&POAM-2026-167, closed in certified Gate W8956f505).
Seam contract (concrete broker open under
POAM-2026-072):CredentialBrokerAdapterdefines the Layer 1 per-dispatch credential seam: when a concrete broker is injected intoActuator01BindingAdapter, credentials are requested per dispatch keyed on the calling agent's SVID and tool name, injected as request headers only in local scope, and excluded fromActuationReceipt, findings, and HTTP response bodies (test_credential_headers_not_in_audit_record). At HEAD zero concreteCredentialBrokerAdapterimplementations ship insrc/,Actuator01BindingAdapterskips the broker step whenbroker=None, andBrokerActuatorreadsBROKER_API_KEYfromos.environ(reopenedPOAM-2026-072indocs/POAM.md).Masking is prefix-preserving, not total. Log masking applies
value[:8] + "****". For anAuthorization: Bearer <token>header only the scheme survives, but a broker that returns a bare-token header will leak the first 8 characters of the secret into logs. Brokers should return scheme-prefixed header values.
The following patterns are strictly forbidden in production code and will be rejected in review:
- PROHIBITED:
secret = os.environ.get("API_KEY", "default-secret") - REQUIRED: Fail-closed validation asserting
os.environ["API_KEY"]exists and meets minimum entropy length (>= 32 chars).
- PROHIBITED:
subprocess.run(command, shell=True) - REQUIRED:
subprocess.run(shlex.split(command))with direct argument lists.
- PROHIBITED:
requests.get(url, verify=False) - REQUIRED: Explicit TLS certificate verification (
verify=True).
- PROHIBITED:
pickle.loads(data)or unconstrainedyaml.load(data) - REQUIRED:
json.loads(data)oryaml.safe_load(data).
All prohibited patterns are enforced via static grep checks, pre-commit hooks, CI security jobs, and targeted unit regression suites in tests/test_*_security.py.
The CAGE maintainers thank the following researchers for reporting security and governance boundary observations with reproducible test cases:
- Daniel Fairbanks (
@danofairanks) — Boundary analyses and hardening reports across CAGE's runtime governance, provenance, and offline evaluation planes (#379,#405,#406,#463,#464,#465,#472,#473,#511,#512,#513,#514,#516), including trajectoryNARROWvs.ALLOWmetric separation, multi-turn shadow-state tier parity,RefusalReceiptproof_hashverification and DPOchosen-argument sanitization, offline drawback-detector,SKILL.mdstatic-linter, rollout-runner symbol/HTTP bounds, fail-closed Stage 2 certification gating (--stage0-only), positive-lift and drawback enforcement inrun_certification_gate(),STPAValidatoraction normalization / approval-token validation / core-rule preservation,actuator_02signed-receipt enforcement, FTRANaN-confidence guards, FTRA registryexpires_atenforcement, retry-safe evidence stream appends and chain-truncation detection, stage- and evidence-bound.cerskill-certification receipts (cage.skill.cer.v2), full-order routing-verdict reuse and multi-step trade plan previews, MCP send-phase retry boundaries andExecutionLedgertrade idempotency, and explicit end-user principal assertion boundaries. @moiznationzz— Reported the compliance-bridge dual-control quorum bypass via unverifiedx-cage-source-principalheaders,CAGE_ENVdefault authentication bypass inde5534ac:deployment/k8s/compliance-bridge.yaml, and uninvokedverify_webauthn_challenge()inDeferQueue.approve()(GHSA-529c-23c8-3m42).@Zorta-Zenith— Independently reported thex-cage-source-principalmulti-party quorum forgery and OIDC fallback gap insrc/compliance_bridge/auth.py(GHSA-qrg7-27x4-mq39).@m0ssser— Reported thedocker-compose.ymlentrypoint override exposingmcp_tool_server.py'sPOST /tools/execute(trigger_safety_intervention) withoutWorkloadIdentityMiddleware(GHSA-4x3x-w2m3-8mfh).@ArksherX— Reported Control Barrier Function (CBF) ground-truth balance verification and atomic reservation boundary findings (GHSA-cmwm-295c-gjf6,GHSA-w7g7-wjj9-6j97,GHSA-w7f4-8grh-2xv8).@uwezkhan— Reported the inference proxy multi-role / streaming governance bypass (GHSA-hfqj-24cj-693g) and/governance/validate-actioningress authentication boundary (GHSA-v3h4-8458-5ww3).- Dominik Blain (
@dom-omg), Ironproof — Reported, with step-by-step reproductions, that a normative-provider determination revoked during human review was never re-checked after approval (the EU_ECBfriatier did not run under POST_HITL), thatexecute_trade_boundedand case or whitespace variants ofBTCbypassedtrade_governance.rego, and that the FRIA payload named no caller and the provider_01 request relied on self-asserted mandate facts (GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm, POAM-2026-113). Thank you for a careful, clearly reasoned report. @kitkatt7— Reported and submitted remediations for partner adapter verification boundaries acrossprovider_06evidence-hash binding (GHSA-348p-gfpg-qqm9,#799),actuator_03signed quarantine receipt enforcement (GHSA-5438-3wwf-qvcq,#808), andprovider_05live/v0.3/attestation signatures (GHSA-cxxx-6xfq-vvp4,#809), as well as earlier public hardening submissions (#517;#662, consolidated into#742).@katesaikishore— Reported that non-content OpenAI-compatible response fields (reasoningaliases,refusal,audio,annotations,logprobs, legacyfunction_call, and raw SSE replay) bypassed governed inference proxy output governance and PII redaction (GHSA-5c7p-g73w-v4m3, fixed via explicit egress-allowlist response reconstruction in#814).@oyesanyf— Reported thatrequire_api_key()in the governed financial advisor accepted end-user OIDC tokens on service-only routes (GHSA-797p-rrgm-4p56, fixed in#813).