Only the latest released version of TrafficCop receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.4.x | ✅ |
| < 1.4 | ❌ |
Please report security vulnerabilities privately — do not open a public GitHub issue.
- Email: support@zerosandones.us (subject line starting with
[SECURITY]) - GitHub: use private vulnerability reporting
Include, where possible:
- A description of the vulnerability and its impact
- Steps to reproduce (a minimal config is ideal)
- The TrafficCop version and platform affected
- Acknowledgement within 72 hours
- Assessment and severity triage within 7 days
- Fix and coordinated disclosure: we aim to release a patched version before public disclosure, and will credit reporters in the release notes unless they prefer otherwise
In scope: anything exploitable in the trafficcop binary or library —
authentication bypasses in middleware (basicAuth, digestAuth, jwt,
forwardAuth), request smuggling or header injection through the proxy,
TLS/ACME handling flaws, denial-of-service vectors, and unsafe defaults.
Out of scope: vulnerabilities in backends TrafficCop proxies to, misconfiguration of deployments, and issues requiring access to the host.
- Set
api.token— without it, mutating admin endpoints are disabled, but read endpoints remain open on the admin port; bind the admin port to a trusted network either way. - Configure
forwardedHeaders.trustedIPson entrypoints behind a load balancer; by default all forwarded headers from untrusted peers are stripped. - Set
transport.maxRequestBodyByteson internet-facing entrypoints.